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Brigitte Young 
1. Gender and Globalization: A Contested Terrain 
Globalization has become the lingua franca of the last decade, yet its use in 
mainstream published works offers only master narratives focusing on the 
hypermobility of capital, the global communication and technology revolution, and the 
construction of a new geography of space and time under global capitalism. These 
mainstream accounts largely ignore the wide-spread localization of global processes, 
thus making invisible the different ways globalization affects women (Sowi-online 
Journal 2002). The almost exclusively male global elite managing the transnational 
corporations and the designers of the global financial architecture have not only 
welcomed the new global order, they also have benefited the most from the 
increased flexibility and informality of labor, money and politics. If women, ethnic 
minorities, and marginalized groups do appear in any of these elite accounts, it is 
only in terms of their deficiencies: they lack human capital; they have failed to adapt 
to the speed of technological change; and they are burdened with the time-
consuming task of rearing children and caring for the elderly. These deficiencies have 
made them the “losers of globalization”. 
Globalization has been a powerful source of change affecting many aspects of 
political, economic, social, and cultural life at the local, national, regional, and global 
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levels. Largely hidden from the mainstream accounts are the complex ways in which 
globalization is materialized at these various levels, and how the increasing 
integration of women into the labor force has had very complex and contradictory 
effects on women and other marginalized groups in these spatial localities. The 
effects on women are multiple and contradictory. They range from empowerment to 
conservative backlash, to integration in the global economy and even to violence; 
resulting in both an intensification and erosion of gender differences. 
Despite important differences between the industrial countries, the East European 
transitional countries, and many parts of the developing countries, globalization has 
invariably produced cheap-wage zones. These enclaves of the informal economy 
have become a permanent feature of the formal economy. The informalization of the 
economy is thus no longer a marginal or transitional phenomenon. It is an immanent 
part of economic globalization. In the North, increasingly we see conditions of the 
“South” and in the Southern countries enclaves emerge that have much in common 
with the “North” (Die Gruppe von Lissabon 1997). New hierarchies of class, gender, 
and race emerge in this system of flexible accumulation. 
The current transformation at the global level comes close to what Braudel (1982) 
has called a longue durée, a bourgeois revolutionary change replacing an existing 
social system that can last several decades. In the Western industrialized countries, 
we witness a shift away from the social welfare state and corporatist arrangements 
between the state, labor and capital toward a “competition state” (Hirsch 1995) 
underpinned by a system of market-based globalization. This rewriting of modern 
history includes the transformation of states, markets, and regional entities, and is 
highly gendered. The fundamental restructuring toward a system of “maximal 
markets” and “minimal states” has weakened the male breadwinner model and the 
entire gender governance order that has been associated with the model of 
industrialization. 
The difficulty in analyzing globalization and gender has been the lack of theoretical 
framework(s). This situation has much to do with the concept of globalization itself. It 
remains one of the most overused, but undertheorized concepts. In addition, 
feminists themselves disagree on how to analyze globalization. Some defenders of 
globalization suggest that the shift to a tertiary sector, the rise of a network economy, 
and the breakdown of a rigid social system provide economic and political 
opportunities for the most disadvantaged (Shlaes 2002). Globalization in this view 
creates new political and economic spaces for relative improvements on how women 
and minorities have done before. Others warn about a new trend toward increasing 
gender inequalities around the globe (Bakker 2003; Rai 2002; Benería 2003; Grown, 
Elson, Cagatay 2000). In contrast, many scholars from developing countries argue 
that globalization is nothing new. Economic exploitation for many developing 
countries is not the result of globalization, but is an immanent part of capitalism and 
(neo)-colonialism. 
This essay cannot offer a new or better theory of globalization and gender. Instead, 
an attempt will be made to offer a feminist political economy approach that links 
systems of capitalism (agricultural, industrial, informational, service-centered) to 
specific gender governance orders. The advantage of such an approach is its 
possibility for a systematic analysis of globalization that differentiates between 
different systems of capitalism in both time and space and the gender relations upon 
which these categories have rested. Since we do not know enough about gender 
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governance orders in developing countries, the following will of necessity emphasize 
the changes in the gender governance orders in industrial countries. However, the 
final section will make some suggestions on how we can construct non-Eurocentric 
models of gender governance orders using Asia as an example. 
2. Shifting Gender Governance Orders 
Methodologically, the argument presented here rests on the assumption that the 
transformation of specific historic systems of capitalism goes hand in hand with the 
reconfiguration of gender governance orders. With the concept of gender, the social 
construction of masculinities and feminities is emphasized rather than the biological 
definition of the sexes. Gender thus refers to societal networks of hierarchically-
regulated social relations, which are ordered along a socially dividing line that places 
women on one side and men on the other (Gordon 1993). 
The concept of gender order is used here to refer to institutionalized practices and 
forms of gendered systems of domination that are constituted as social ordering 
principles in all societies. Social norms, rules, regulations, and principles are not 
gender neutral entities, but are inscribed with specific norms for the roles men and 
women are designed to play in the polity. The networks of overlapping social and 
cultural mores then become embedded in the institutional structures of the polity. 
These institutionalized gender practices are far from being static entities, but are 
continually reproduced through the organization or structure of practice that persists 
in its effects on subsequent practices. The process of institutionalization means, as 
Connell (1987) points out, to create conditions that make cyclical practice probable. 
Gender governance orders are the aggregate of these gender regimes at the level of 
macro-politics. The interaction between state powers that bear on gender relations, 
cultural definitions of gender and the historical possibilities in gender relations make 
up these orders. They are stabilized through the various micro- and meso-practices 
that ensure the reproduction of these macro-political orders. Stabilized means that 
gender governance orders become sufficiently institutionalized as a result of specific 
historic systems of capital accumulation. Women and men continuously renegotiate 
the meaning of gender identity, struggling over the formation and dissolution of 
accepted categories, and the reconfiguration of institutional relations (Connell 1987). 
3. Old versus New Gender Governance Orders 
The gender governance orders of the welfare state model can be summarized as 
consisting of three central elements (Young 1998): 
1. The role of women, despite their integration into the labor markets, was tied to the 
reproductive and private sphere.  
2. The role of women identified with the private arena corresponded with the male’s 
role as the “breadwinner”. 
3. A gender-specific separation between the private and the public characterized the 
welfare state system. 
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In the geometry between class and gender, men were subordinated directly to the 
market. Women, on the other hand, were subordinated directly to men and only 
indirectly to market forces. The present restructuring of the global economy and the 
increasing internationalization of capitalism has undermined this system of gender 
governance orders. We can identify at least four central new aspects of the gender 
governance order that are the result of economic global restructuring. First, the model 
of the male breadwinner is a phenomenon of the past. Second, the stark gender-
specific separation between the public and the private and the associated 
assignment to the reproductive and productive economy no longer reflect the reality 
of the situation. Third, while equality has increased among men and women of the 
middle class, we witness an increasing rise of inequality and differentiation among 
women depending on their race, class and nationality (Young 2001). Finally, a new 
gender-specific social division is emerging between those (mostly male) who frequent 
the hypermobile “money society”, and those (mostly female and unskilled) that 
remain bound to the national “work territory”. These changes do not imply negative 
consequences only for women. They also have the potential of weakening and 
dissolving local, patriarchal cultures and systems of male domination. 
3.1. Decline of the Family Wage Model 
Globalization has eroded the material conditions for the male breadwinner and his 
dependent wife and family. The increasing rise of double wage-earners since the 70s 
is a byproduct of this development. Double wage-earner families can be divided into 
two groups. On the one side are the relatively well-off professionals who are part of 
the formal economy. A much larger group can be found in the medium and lower 
levels of the economy, who rely on the additional wage of women to maintain or 
improve their living standards. There is also the group of single parents (mostly 
female), whose numbers have increased dramatically in all Western industrial 
countries. The increasing “feminization of the labor process” has undermined the 
family wage system. Most wages in the informal economy are no longer adequate to 
support a family; nor do they any longer provide economic security. The increasing 
integration of women in the labor market has promoted new definitions of gender 
roles and has led to changes in the social value structure. The norms of social 
welfare states where women are dependent on the male breadwinner are being 
replaced by the increasing individualization of women (Brodie 2003; Elson 1994; 
Bakker 2003). 
3.2. The Reconfiguration of the Public and the Private 
The informalization of the labor market has greatly undermined the separation 
between the productive and reproductive economy. This separation was once the 
hallmark of the social welfare state model. Increasingly the processes of production 
and reproduction (also of social reproduction) are played out in a wide spectrum 
ranging from the informal, formal, and household economies. The conceptual 
separation between the private and the public does not take into account that the 
daily work of many women is done in a “triple shift” between formal, informal, and 
family or subsistence activities (Hossfeld 1990). Whether this work is done by women 
in the Caribbean, in Asia or in Silicon Valley, its common feature is that women’s 
work is a combination of activities in formal transnational production, in informal 
sectors, and in the subsistence economy. The borders of this “triple shift” are quite 
fluid for women, but relatively rigid for men. Males are rarely found in the household 
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economy and work either as subcontractors in the informal economy, or in the formal 
economy. 
To the degree that the male breadwinner role is pushed more and more into the 
background, women are forced to earn their livings in a combination of the private 
and the public spheres. Increasingly large numbers work on call in paid tele- and 
home-based activities in their homes (private sphere), are found in sweatshops 
(neither private nor public), or with their babies on their backs in the “global factories” 
(mixture of production and reproduction). Among other things, this means that the 
concept of a regular, statistically defined work-time utilized in the formal economy is 
no longer adequate to define the new forms of the “feminization of work”. 
3.3. Increasing Polarization among Women 
The rising integration of women into the labor force has also meant a greater 
disparity among women belonging to a different class, race and nationality. Although 
the new members of the new “club society” are mostly the “new boys”, as Wendy 
Larner (1996) calls the new global players of the neoliberal New Zealand model, 
professional white middle-class women in the knowledge and information industries 
are no longer a rarity. Linda McDowell (1997) has shown in her study of the male 
finance stronghold of the City of London that a slight crack did open for a new class 
of female professionals. As a result of the expanding international service economy, 
young, well-educated females succeeded in entering the middle and upper echelons 
of the finance and business world in the “global cities”, although with the caveat, as 
Saskia Sassen has pointed out, “… that notwithstanding the growing number of top 
level women professionals in global economic activities and in international relations, 
both these worlds can be specified as male-gendered insofar as each in its distinct 
way has the cultural properties and power dynamics that we have historically 
associated with men of power, or least some power” (1996, 10). 
Labor market segmentation into a high-paid “informational economy” and the 
expanding informal sector of the “laboring poor” has increased the disparity among 
women. Low-skilled service jobs are not just an important part of the infrastructure of 
the formal economy. They also permit socially privileged women in Europe, North 
America and in other countries access to a professional career. As long as women, 
independent of their social class, remain responsible for reproductive work, the 
conditions upon which women enter “male” structures are gender-specific. Socially 
privileged females have the advantage of falling back upon mostly cheap, often 
illegal immigrants, to perform household tasks and child-rearing. Without adequate 
public child-care services, and without the fallback position of women from 
developing and transitional countries, women would not be able to climb the 
professional ranks that demand great personal mobility and flexibility. Whether these 
activities are performed by mostly overqualified Polish women in Germany, or 
African-American and Latin American immigrants in the United States, they lead to a 
new international division of labor at the household level. On the one side is the 
“Mistress” and on the other stands the “Maid”, separated by different racial, ethnic, 
and national backgrounds (Young 2001). A professional woman’s career of the 
European or American middle or upper class is thus possible only in the narrow 
confines of ethnicity, class, and gender. 
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3.4. Reprivatization of Social Reproduction 
Globalization has led to a social division between those who remain tied to a 
territorially bounded “work society” and the “money society” that is no longer 
constrained by national boundaries. This opposition between the global money 
society and a national “work society” resulted from the “disembedding” of the 
monetary sphere from the productive economy (Altvater, Mahnkopf 1996). Huge 
profits are now made in the sphere of financial circulation and not in material 
production. As a result, finance capital has become dominant in the global economy. 
The separation between finance capital and place-bound capital also explains the 
present crisis of the welfare state. Despite a “borderless” global economy, the 
majority of women and men continue to depend on the solidarity and the “community 
of fate” of national societies. It was after all the nation-state that extended political 
rights to the working class and integrated them as citoyens. The territory of the 
nation-state thus became the “political and social home” of the working class. Within 
the boundaries of the national territory, the Keynesian full-employment guarantees 
provided the economic stability criteria for the social welfare state model. The nation-
state was also the vehicle for creating a national identity. These political rights went 
hand in hand with a specific modern form of patriarchal welfare state (Gordon 1993). 
In their triple dependence on the welfare state (as social workers, clients and 
consumers), women are particularly hard hit by the social welfare crisis. As a result of 
the reduction of public services, they are “punished” in various ways. First, reducing 
social services means that these services once again become part of the non-
monetarized private sphere. Cutting costs for the care of the elderly, in the health 
sector, and for education places these care burdens again on the shoulders of 
women. Second, the present privatization of these social services destroys the very 
conditions that have made the integration of women in the labor market possible. 
Particularly for women in the lower skilled professions, publicly provided child-care 
services often make the difference between seeking employment and staying home. 
Finally, social service jobs generated by the Keynesian welfare state disappear with 
the dismantling of public services. Under the conditions of global competition and the 
push for the lowest “single price”, the logic of the global economy and the logic of the 
social welfare state are on a collision course. 
Globalization has thus fundamentally challenged the very notion of what is public and 
what is private. In the process, it has worsened gender-specific social divisions. The 
neoliberal “reprivatization discourse” seeks to repatriate the economic and social to 
the former domestic enclave. Reprivatization of the domestic, as Janine Brodie 
(2003) argues, has elevated and revitalized the patriarchal family. It rests on the 
dubious assumptions that the family is responsible for social reproduction, and that a 
family still consists of the male “breadwinner” and his dependents. Aside from the 
conservative and ideological premise of these assumptions, they neglect to take into 
account the changing reality of the family. The social welfare gender order no longer 
exists. Today’s reality is that women – even if they wanted to – no longer have the 
“luxury” to remain as caretakers in the home. In ever greater numbers, women have 
joined the labor market, while labor market participation rates for males has stabilized 
or even declined. How the reproductive issues will be resolved in this “borderless” 
global economy is the million dollar question for the next generation. 
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Finding a gender-conscious resolution of the tasks connected with social 
reproduction is made all the more difficult by the changes in the social structure and 
the reorganization of existing power relations. The state no longer is guided by a 
Keynesian logic, but is driven by the logic of competition. These changes have also 
produced fundamental reorganizations within the state apparatus itself. State 
ministries associated with the Keynesian welfare states, such as labor and social and 
human services, have all been devalorized at the expense of the valorization of 
economic and finance ministries. The reorganization has not weakened, hollowed 
out, or marginalized the authority of the state as is suggested by a majority of the 
globalization literature. True, the singular focus on the decline of public services may 
support such a view. However, this one-sided focus on the welfare state has failed to 
take into account new power centers that have arisen in the state and are closely tied 
to the global financial and economic interests (Sassen 2000). 
4. Future Research on Shifting Gender Governance Orders 
in Developing Countries 
In respect to worldwide development which affect rich and poor countries in different 
ways, Truong (2000) has recently warned that a Eurocentric perspective does not 
sufficiently come to grips with how gender governance orders have been 
reconfigured during the development process of the “Asian miracle” and its 
subsequent decline in the 1990s (Truong 2000). She argues that neither the Asian 
miracle nor the Asian crisis of 1997/98 and its aftermath can be understood without 
focusing on the gender norms and values that have guided much of Asian growth. 
Only through a systematic understanding of how gender orders were transformed 
during the process of the Asian miracle, can we understand the reconfiguration of 
gender governance orders in the process of neo-liberal restructuring after the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997/98. 
Truong (2000) identifies a four-tier gender order for Asian countries: 
– The wager earner, constructed along male norms with a formal wage system and 
protection. 
– Casual workers constructed along female norms and confined to temporary, part-
time contracts, piece rates and irregular work. Such norms can be allied 
irrespective of the gender. 
– The dependent housewife – responsible for the maintenance of the workforce and 
care work – which may or may not combine unpaid care work with paid work. 
– Paid “reproductive workers” who take up either different forms of sexualized 
services in prostitution and entertainment, or domestic services (Truong 2000, 
161). 
The particular gender ideology and gender governance orders Truong refers to are 
based on the glorification of subservience and sacrifice as female virtues that are 
manifested in the particular gender-orders of East Asia. Indeed, the World Bank East 
Asia Environment and Social Development Unit also cautions about the use of 
aggregate statistics which do not reflect the cultural, legal and institutional differences 
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faced by men and women in different political and economic settings. Analyzing 
men’s and women’s labor force participation in Korea, one analyst cites Confucian 
traditions and patriarchal family systems as the institutional basis for gender 
discrimination that pervades all social, and political and economic structures. 
East Asian gender governance orders of female subservience are crucial in 
understanding how women were integrated into the labor force during the period of 
the “Asian miracle”. The shift from import-substitution to export-oriented strategies in 
Asian economies led to a vast increase of women in the labor force. In Korea, 
women’s rate of employment increased from 36.3% in 1963 to 48.7% in 1996 (Yoon 
1998). However, as feminist economists have recently demonstrated, the integration 
of women was based on a form of gendered wage inequality. In a fascinating study, 
Seguino argues that such gender inequality helped to stimulate growth in the East 
Asian economies. Low female wages have spurred investment and exports by 
lowering unit labor costs, providing the foreign exchange to purchase capital and 
intermediate goods that raise productivity and growth rates. These discriminatory 
practices were made possible by gender norms forcing women to accept their low 
status and low pay (Seguino 2000, 27). 
It is not surprising, then, that when the Asian financial crisis unfolded in 1997/98, 
women were more disadvantaged by the cyclical instability and economic depression 
than men. This in turn had devastating repercussions on the sustainability of social 
reproduction affecting women, children, families, and also entire communities and 
regions. Despite the much higher unemployment rate of Korean women as a result of 
the financial crisis, the state appealed to women to provide a psychological cushion 
for males who lost employment. With the slogan “Get Your Husband Energized”, the 
state invoked the traditional norm of the men as family provider and women as care-
givers (Singh, Zammit 2000; Yoon 1998). 
One has to be careful not to make normative judgments about the disruption of 
traditional gender governance orders that are often highly discriminatory and abusive 
to women. However, the change in gender orders has, on the whole, not resulted in 
more empowerment and greater emancipatory power for women to demand equal 
justice and equality, largely because it is the result of greater economic immiseration 
that leaves many marginalized, low skilled women worse off in the process. Having 
been robbed of the social safety net and the traditional protection of families and 
men, women and children seem to bear the major brunt in industrial and developing 
countries of intensified globalization (Young 2003). 
References 
Altvater, Elmar; Mahnkopf, Birgit. 1996. Grenzen der Globalisierung – Ökonomie, 
Ökologie und Politik in der Weltgesellschaft. Münster. 
Bakker, Isabella. 2003. Neo-Liberal Governance and the Reprivatization of Social 
Reproduction – Social Provisioning and Shifting Gender Orders. In: Bakker, Isabella; 
Gill, Stephen, eds. Power, Production and Social Reproduction – Human In/Security 
in the Global Political Economy. Basingstoke, 66-82. 
Benería, Lourdes. 2003. Gender, Development, and Globalization – Economics as if 
all people mattered. New York, London. 
 9
Braudel, Ferdinand. 1982. Civilizations and Capitalism – 15th-18th Century. New 
York. 
Brodie, Janine. 2003. Globalization, In/Security, and the Paradoxes of the Social, In: 
Bakker, Isabella; Gill, Stephen, eds. Power, Production and Social Reproduction – 
Social Provisioning and Shifting Gender Orders. Basingstoke, 47-65. 
Connell, Robert W. 1987. Gender and Power – Society, the Person and Sexual 
Politics. Stanford.  
Die Gruppe von Lissabon. 1997. Grenzen des Wettbewerbs – Die Globalisierung der 
Wirtschaft und die Zukunft der Menschheit. München. 
Elson, Diane. 1994. Micro, Meso, Macro – Gender and Economic Analysis in the 
Context of Policy Reform. In: Bakker, Isabella, ed. The Strategic Silence Gender and 
Economic Policy – Gender and Economic Policy. London, 33-45. 
Gill, Stephen. 2003. Power and Resistance in the New World Order. Basingstoke. 
Gordon, Linda. 1993. Gender, State and Society – A Debate with Theda Skocpol. In: 
Contention, Vol. 2 (3), 139-156. 
Grown, Caren; Elson, Diane; Cagatay, Nilufer. 2000. Introduction, In: World 
Development, Vol. 28 (7), 1145-1156. 
Hirsch, Joachim. 1995. Der nationale Wettbewerbsstaat – Staat, Demokratie und 
Politik im globalen Kapitalismus. Berlin. 
Hossfeld, Karen J. 1990. “Their Logic against Them” – Contradictions in Sex, Race 
and Class in Silicon Valley. In: Ward, Kathryn B., ed. Women Workers and Global 
Restructuring. Ithaca/NY, 149–178. 
Larner, Wendy. 1996. The “New Boys” – Restructuring in New Zealand, 1984-94. In: 
Social Politics, Vol. 3 (1), 32-56. 
McDowell, Linda. 1997. Capital Culture – Gender at Work in the City. Oxford. 
Rai, Shirin M. 2002. Gender and the Political Economy of Development – From 
Nationalism to Globalisation. Cambridge. 
Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy. In: 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 4 (1), 7-41. 
Sassen, Saskia. 2000. Women’s Burden – Counter-Geographies of Globalization and 
the Feminization of Survival. In: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53 (2), 503-524. 
Seguino, Stephanie. 2000. Accounting for Gender in Asian Economic Growth. In: 
Feminist Economics, Vol. 6 (3), 27-58. 
Singh, Ajit; Zammit, Ann. 2000. International Capital Flows – Identifying the Gender 
Dimensions. In: World Development, Vol. 28 (7), 1249-1268. 
 10
Shlaes, Amity. 2002. Is inequality good for you? In: Financial Times, December 7/8, 
11. 
Sowi-online Journal. 2002. Onlinejournal für Sozialwissenschaften und ihre Didaktik, 
Vol. 3 (1). (http://www.sowi-onlinejournal.de/2002-1/index.en.html) publiziert 
01.08.2003. 
Truong, Thanh-Dam. 2000. A Feminist Perspective on the Asian Miracle and Crisis – 
Enlarging the Conceptual Map of Human Development. In: Journal of Human 
Development, Vol. 1 (1), 159-164. 
Yoon, Bang-Soon. 1998. Koreanische Frauen in der globalen Ökonomie – 
Industrialisierung und Geschlechterpolitik in Südkorea. In: PROKLA, Vol. 111, 217-
234. 
Young, Brigitte. 1998. Genderregime und Staat in der globalen Netzwerkökonomie. 
In: PROKLA, Vol. 111, 175-198. 
Young, Brigitte. 2001. The ”Mistress” and the ”Maid” in the Globalized Economy. In: 
Socialist Register, Vol. 38, 315-327. 
Young, Brigitte. 2003. Financial Crises and Social Reproduction – Asia, Argentina 
and Brazil. In: Bakker, Isabella; Gill, Stephen, eds. Power, Production and Social 
Reproduction – Human In/Security in the Global Political Economy. Basingstoke, 
103-123. 
